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Introduction: Locating the (post-)colonial in Soviet history

ADEEB KHALID

How are we to think about Central Asia’s experience of the 20th century? What analytical sense are we to make of the seven decades of Soviet rule that dominated it? What relation—conceptual, analytical, metaphorical—does Central Asia have to the rest of what used to be called ‘the Third World’? What place does the Soviet Union occupy in the wider history of interactions between ‘Europe’ and the rest of the world? These questions have been pushed to the forefront of the scholarly agenda in the humanities and the social sciences by the ‘emergence’ of nominally sovereign states from under the rubble of the Soviet collapse.

Empire as a category for analysing the Soviet past seemed to suggest itself in the circumstances. After all, Central Asia was a region conquered by a European empire in the 19th century which, unlike the rest of Asia, did not win independence in the mid 20th century. It was easy to see the emergence of the five new states in 1991 as delayed decolonization, with the experience of the new states directly comparable with those of the ‘Third World’, and the Soviet Union directly comparable with other European colonial empires. The fact that the Soviet collapse took place just as the field of colonial and postcolonial studies matured in Anglo-American academe and had begun to transform our understanding of the cultural and political work of empire proved felicitous, and ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, conceptual paradigms developed in the multidisciplinary study European overseas empires have posed extremely fruitful challenges to our conceptualizations of the modern history of Central Asia and of the Soviet Union at large.1

Empire also emerged as one of the most important questions in the post-Soviet historiography of the Soviet Union as a whole. During the political crisis that led to its demise, the Soviet Union came to be derided as an ‘empire’ from all points on the political compass—not just hostile foreign observers who had long characterized the Soviet Union as an empire, but also Soviet critics, Russian and non-Russian alike. Not only did national intelligentsias and political elites from the non-Russian republics of the union begin using the vocabulary of empire and colonialism to discredit the regime, but ordinary Russians did too. During the drama of the failed coup of August 1991, protestors, predominantly Russians, carried placards proclaiming, ‘Down with the Empire of the Red Fascists!’ Much of this
rhetoric was a matter of reflex, capitalizing on the negative connotations evoked by the terms ‘empire’ and ‘colonialism’. The last two decades have, however, seen sophisticated debate on whether, or to what extent, the Soviet Union was an empire and what it means to our understanding of it.²

Although much of this debate in Soviet history does not engage directly with postcolonial studies (and historians of imperial Russia remain largely immune to postcolonial theory),³ the impact of postcolonial studies has been more pronounced within Central Asian studies. As a new generation of scholars has grappled with understanding the Soviet legacy in Central Asia, and the specificities of Soviet modernization and its effects, they have been faced with the problem of what to make of the Soviet experience. Several scholars have sought to theorize points of intersection between post-colonialism and post-socialism.⁴ A number of scholars of Central Asia have consciously used insights from postcolonial theory to frame their work,⁵ while others have sought out even broader perspectives to social transformation and cultural change.

Yet, the straightforward comparison of the Soviet Union with other colonial empires is fraught with problems. The Soviet Union could (and did) claim to be a postcolonial state itself, and its early history was tied inextricably with such global themes as anticolonial revolution, decolonization, nation-building, economic development, modernization and the quest to overcome ‘backwardness’. Indeed, the ‘colonial question’ was from the outset knit closely into the Bolshevik agenda. For Lenin, the ‘national’ and ‘colonial’ questions were completely intertwined in Russia itself, where (most) ‘nationalities’ were part of the ‘colonial’ periphery of the Russian empire, but the ‘colonial question’ was also a key feature of Communism’s global strategy. The high point of the colonial question in Bolshevik strategy came in the years 1919–1921, when, in Trotsky’s famous phrase, ‘the road to [revolution in] Paris and London [lay] via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal’.⁶ Central Asia was to play a central role in this strategy, as the ‘front door to the East’, and a possible catalyst for revolution not just in Afghanistan and India, but also in Iran and China. The second congress of the Comintern in 1920 discussed the colonial question at length and even established a Turkestan Bureau of the Comintern in Tashkent to oversee this business. The enthusiasm for world revolution subsided fairly quickly, but in 1925 Stalin still saw the establishment of Tajikistan ‘on the gates of Hindustan’ as an example for ‘Eastern countries’.⁷ Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Central Asia was touted to the Third World as a case of Soviet modernization that had bypassed capitalism and undone the injustices of colonialism.

This idea had considerable traction in the colonial world. Indeed, the Russian revolution might be seen as the birthplace of Third Worldism, the notion that the liberation of the colonial world is the business of the colonial peoples themselves, but it has to be brought about in the name of universalist ideals. The case of Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev is well known,⁸ but he was hardly the only one. There were many other figures like him in the Soviet Union, most notably Nariman Narimanov in Azerbaijan and Turar Rysqulov in Turkestan.⁹ The Russian revolution also inspired anticolonial figures from across the world.

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Many in the colonial world saw the Soviet Union as having brought about a successful solution to questions of colonial difference. For George Padmore, the incorporation of former colonies into a single state, with equal economic and citizenship rights, was a challenge to other imperialist powers.\textsuperscript{10} Langston Hughes, the great African-American poet, saw in Soviet Central Asia the successful abolition of the colour line and, indeed, of the distinction between ‘East’ and ‘West’.\textsuperscript{11} During the Cold War, the Soviet Union inspired many in the Third World as embodying an alternative path to modernization, but also as a power that was both anticolonial and postcolonial. Two decades on from the end of the Cold War, such views might appear to us naïve and misguided, but any dispassionate understanding of the history of the 20th century requires us to remember the meanings the Soviet experiment held for the colonial world.

The hope behind the call for papers that originated this special issue of \textit{Central Asian Survey} was to bring together contributions from scholars working on diverse aspects of Soviet interventions in the economic, social and cultural life of Central Asia, in order to make the emerging debates and perspectives more easily accessible to students of the region. The response was quite gratifying and the task of selecting papers for inclusion in the issue a difficult one. Ultimately, the choice was dictated in part by a concern for topical coherence and the hope that the contributions would speak to each other in ways that would highlight points of emergent agreement or dispute. The articles presented here offer a variety of strengths and concerns. Some are archivally rich explorations of the complex interactions between local populations and elites of the republics and the Soviet centre in the formative decades of Soviet Central Asia. Others offer explicitly comparative perspectives in juxtaposing the Soviet experience of Central Asia with that of other colonial encounters. The articles cover various aspects of the Soviet period, and include interventions from outside the Anglo-American academic orbit. All, however, have the common aim of placing Soviet Central Asia on the widest comparative canvas possible.

\textbf{The Soviet as postcolonial?}

We begin with three archivally rich papers that discuss various aspects of the history of the early Soviet period. The documentary record left by the Soviet state and party apparatuses is massive and will take generations to explore, but it makes possible a closer acquaintance with the complexities of the operation of state and party organs, the contests that went on over them, and the zigzags party and state policies went through. Most importantly, these articles take the investigation of the early Soviet history of Central Asia into new directions. A great deal of existing work on the period deals with what may broadly be called ‘cultural’ issues—identity, religion, political campaigns—and relegates matters of institutions and economics to the background. These three articles bring issues of institutions and economics to the forefront.

Niccolò Pianciola and Paolo Sartori use the state archives of Uzbekistan to investigate the fate of Muslim endowed properties (\textit{waqf}) in the early Soviet
period. *Waqf* was an essential feature of Muslim societies, an institution rooted in Islamic law and a means for financing the infrastructure for the production and reproduction of ‘Islam’. *Waqf* also represented a substantial economic resource, which made it ripe for regulation once modern states began to assert greater control over societies and economies. In the 19th century, both Muslim states and colonial powers sought to regulate *waqf* in broadly analogous fashions. At the same time, *waqf* was the subject of intense debate among Muslims, with many reformers in favour of putting *waqf* revenues to new uses.

The Russian revolution provided a new context for these debates. The Soviet regime had much greater ambitions for intervening in society and transforming it. It also saw itself as explicitly anticolonial and sought to mobilize support among the indigenous population of the region. This combination of circumstances allowed many reformist Muslims to join the new organs of power being built, and it made *waqf* the object of contestation between different stripes of Muslims and between society and the new state. Pianciola and Sartori provide an extremely rich account of the vagaries of Soviet control of the situation and the intense debates that raged over the question of *waqf*. The anticolonial rhetoric of the new regime ran into the reality of continuities from the colonial past, as tsarist categories and tsarist practices continued to shape the new order. The authors argue that the new order, regardless of the inclusion of Muslim reformers in the *waqf* administration that emerged by 1922, made little difference in the ability of the state to administer *waqf*. Nevertheless, the institutionalization of bureaucratic control (in the form of the Main Administration of *Waqfs* in Turkestan) did give the state new avenues of regulation and made the ultimate confiscation of *waqf* in 1928 possible. By that time, the Soviet state had wrested control of its institutions from Muslim reformers, who found that their ability to shape the course of reform had evaporated.

As they explore the comparisons with other states, Pianciola and Sartori define the Soviet regime in Turkestan as postcolonial. There were differences, to be sure, between Turkestan’s early Bolsheviks and what the centre desired, but there can be little question that the new regime was very conscious of its anticolonial credentials and the need to distance itself from its colonial inheritance. This compulsion, both ideological and pragmatic, lay behind the regime’s desire to mobilize the indigenous population and to seek ways of redistributing resources.

Christian Teichman pushes this point even further, arguing in his article that early Soviet policies in Central Asia were conceived as a form of decolonization. The revolution promised freedom from colonial domination and national self-determination, as well as the end of economic exploitation through the redistribution of resources between colonizers and the colonized and eventual modernization. Decolonization is a term associated with the retreat of European overseas empires after the Second World War, which resulted in the proclamation of formal sovereignty by former colonies. National self-determination was a key slogan as the new postcolonial states took their place on the world stage. They also faced enormous challenges—of creating state apparatuses rooted in the indigenous populations, of creating or strengthening new national identities, of
creating a new economic order, of modernization. All of these challenges were pre-
figured in the Russian revolution and the early Soviet state. Yet, the Soviet agenda
for ‘decolonization’ was ultimately trumped by ‘modernization’, as state policies
emphasized productivity at the expense of the indigenization of the state apparatus.
Teichman explores the contradictions between these goals, as well as the relation-
ships and frictions between several levels of government in the Soviet Union.
The contradictions between decolonization and economic development created
new configurations of power in Central Asian societies, even as the first generation
of Soviet Central Asian political elites paid for them with their lives.

Beatrice Penati similarly explores the mechanisms of the establishment of
Soviet rule in one part of Central Asia. Eastern Bukhara was the rural, mountai-
nous hinterland of the emirate of Bukhara—the most ‘backward’ part of a
region known to the Soviets for its backwardness—where the Basmachi flourished
in the aftermath of the overthrow of the emir in 1920. A great deal has been written
about the Basmachi, although much of it is tendentious and confined to broad
brush strokes that fail to reveal the complexities of the encounter. Penati uses
part of the rich vein of documentary record produced by the Soviet campaigns
against the Basmachi to explore the consequences of the ‘struggle against the
Basmachi’ for the local population. The struggle was spearheaded by a ‘special
commission’, with the army and the political police calling the shots, but it ulti-
mately involved cultivating support in local society, with initiatives ranging from
enlisting members of the indigenous population in ‘voluntary detachments’ to
fight the Basmachi, through the establishment of local committees to provide politi-
cal and logistical support for these detachments, to population transfers as a form of
social engineering. For Penati, the establishment of Soviet rule in Eastern Bukhara
was a new conquest, but one which led to new economic and political bonds
between the centre and periphery, a new state order that involved the indigenous
population in a far more direct relationship than had been the case before.

Elif Kale-Lostuvalı returns us to the cultural politics of Soviet rule, but this time
through the little used lens of music. She focuses on ‘musical nationalism’ in
Uzbekistan, i.e. on the way musical traditions were reconfigured and reimagined
as part of nation-building programmes in the early Soviet period. In the 1920s,
local Jadids attempted to elaborate a canon of ‘classical Uzbek music’. This
implied that ‘Uzbek’ music was a living tradition with a path to development sep-
arate from and parallel to European classical music. This attempt at codification
failed. The Party detected in it the odour of bourgeois nationalism and suppressed
it. In the 1930s, central authorities imposed a different model of musical national-
ism, one that was based on a universal European model, with polyphony and the
opera as its crowning glories. Henceforth Uzbek music was to be part of a univer-
sal stream, with a single path of development. Such was Soviet universalism in the
realm of music.

Like the two articles that follow, Kale-Lostuvalı’s article is explicitly compara-
tive. She compares the Uzbek case with that of India, where European classical
music and opera found no roots and where musical nationalism centres on a dis-
tinct tradition of Indian classical music. India might be unique in this case, for
European classical music has found ready acceptance in many other parts of the world. Nevertheless, Kale-Lostuvalı rightly points out the vast differences in the Indian colonial experience and that of Central Asia, and the resultant need to theorize the peculiarities of the Soviet situation.

**Race and gender in the late Soviet Union**

The Soviet population was immensely diverse in terms of ethnicity and ‘race’, as well as levels of economic development. Official rhetoric billed the Soviet Union as the land of the ‘friendship of peoples’ (druzhba narodov), a place where distinct national groups marched along the path to progress in total friendship and harmony. Yet we know rather little about how ‘race’ was constructed in practice, how interethnic relations took place in the everyday life, and how Soviet citizens experienced ethnic and racial difference. In a suggestive essay, Jeff Sahadeo writes about how ‘Soviet Asians’ (i.e. Central Asians and Caucasians) experienced life in Moscow and Leningrad, the two great metropoles of the Soviet Union. For Sahadeo, Moscow after the Second World War was directly comparable with post-war London as a postcolonial capital. He brings to bear on his analysis the highly developed literature on race relations and postcolonial immigration to Britain. Yet, the comparison highlights a number of distinctions between postcolonial Britain and the Soviet Union. Moscow and Leningrad did not see the kind of influx of immigrants from (former) colonies that transformed the face of London during and after decolonization. The Soviet Asians who did live in the two cities now recall their experiences with a considerable degree of nostalgia, emphasizing the reality of druzhba narodov and largely underplaying popular racism, although evidence exists of consciousness of hierarchies and of racist attitudes in ground-level encounters between Russians and Soviet Asian migrants. It was glasnost’ that opened the door for racist violence and harassment by loosening the limits of Soviet discourse and inviting the inversion of existing slogans.

Adrienne Edgar similarly explores the little known terrain of interethnic intimacy in the Soviet Union. From the 1930s on, official policy favoured interethnic marriage, taking it both as a sign of the ‘friendship of peoples’, and as a stepping stone to the eventual merging of the various nationalities into a single ‘Soviet people’. The number of mixed marriages remained small and was most likely between groups that were culturally close to each other. There was some considerable irony in this, for the Soviet state itself had made possible the crystallization of ethnic boundaries (most notably in Central Asia). Nevertheless, intermarriage, especially between Europeans and Muslims, remained an important topic for Soviet theorists, who saw it as a channel for the modernization of ‘backward’ nations, and European women who married Muslim men as bearers of modern Soviet civilization. Edgar places these discourses in a wide comparative framework provided by the very rich literature on interethnic (and interracial) intimacy in a wide variety of colonial settings. Edgar points to some very interesting
parallels as well as many points of departure, but as with Sahadeo, the mere fact of comparison is illuminating, for it places the subject of inquiry in new light.

Our last article, by Deniz Kandiyoti, uses the lens of gender to make some extremely valuable observations on the coloniality of the Soviet Union. Asking how it was possible for conservative gender ideologies to replace Soviet-era policies about gender equality in post-Soviet states, Kandiyoti points to a paradox at the heart of the Soviet project: women’s presence in public life was legitimized by the same socialist paternalism that underwrote a command economy and a nationalities policy that stalled processes of gender transformation usually associated with modernity. While she finds a straightforwardly colonial interpretation of Soviet gender policies not very fruitful, she also reminds us that we have not paid enough critical attention to Soviet modernization either. Instead, she recalls another, older literature on Soviet ‘neo-traditionalism’ that argued that the Soviet Union saw the reversal of many of the transformations associated with modernity. The lens of gender gives these arguments a new force. If Soviet Central Asian women were not colonized, they were also not modern. There are important consequences for analysing post-Soviet policies and ideologies in the realm of gender, for it renders notions of ‘re-traditionalization’ or ‘re-Islamization’ quite devoid of explanatory power. Kandiyoti’s argument also forces us to rethink the connections between the Soviet project, colonialism and modernization.

**Conclusion**

Much of postcolonial theory was generated by the study of the British, French and Dutch overseas empires, but in recent years, ‘postcolonial studies’ has expanded into new areas. Not only has extremely rich work emerged on the colonial empires of Germany,12 Italy,13 and Japan,14 but scholars have pulled empire away from Europe.15 As a result, many of the boundaries—between metropole and colony, citizen and subject—which figured large in debates over whether the Soviet Union was an empire or not have been fatally blurred. We can no longer rejoice in any kind of certainty over what a ‘real’ colonial empire ought to look like. This has important consequences for our subject. The Soviet Union cannot simply be measured up against static definitions of empire or colonialism, nor will the mechanical ‘application’ of postcolonial theory developed elsewhere lead to fruitful insights. Rather, the Soviet case has a great deal to offer to the common endeavour of understanding the complexities of the history of the 20th century and of its aftermaths. Soviet history can broaden the horizons of postcolonial studies by introducing a vast array of historical and cultural encounters little known to the field, but the Soviet case can also inject new caveats and perhaps a new scepticism toward generalizations built on the basis of the experience of mainly bourgeois, western European overseas empires. Soviet history itself benefits immensely from the move toward comparison enabled by postcolonial studies. The papers included in this issue represent an important step in this direction, and the reader will profit from them for this reason.
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Notes and references

Deniz Kandiyoti suggested this special issue. My gratitude goes to her for the initial idea and her support and patience through the process. Many thanks also to Raphaël Jacquet and to the scholars who served as anonymous referees for this issue.

1. We should note, however, that the interest in postcolonial theory is largely an Anglo-American phenomenon, with little resonance in European scholarship. In Central Asia itself, historians have had little interest in it. Certain narrowly circumscribed understandings of colonialism have appeared in official Uzbekistani historiography of the 1990s and early 2000s, but there has been little interest in the new fields of inquiry opened up by postcolonial critique. See, for example, N. A. Abdurakhimova and G. Rustamova, Kolonial'naia sistema vlasti v Turkestane vo vtoroi polovine XIX–pervoi chetverti XX v.v. (Tashkent: Universitet, 1999); and O’zbekistonning yangi tarixi, vol. 2: O’zbekiston sovet mustamlikchiligi davrida (Tashkent: Sharq, 2001). In Russia, while there is no shortage of interest in Russia’s imperial past, critical approaches to empire are less common. The one exception in this regard is the Kazan-based journal Ab Imperio, which has published a number of sophisticated, theoretically rich analyses over the years and which is a conduit for the translation into Russian of key theoretical texts in the realm of postcolonial and nationalism studies.


3. This is the case even as questions of empire have taken an important place in the historiography of imperial Russia. The main tendency in the new literature on the tsarist empire is to investigate the mechanisms that kept the empire functioning, rather than the old focus on why its death was immanent. In some cases, this ambition has produced overstatements—see Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). For works not particularly interested in postcolonial theory, see, for example: Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel, eds, Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998); Daniel R. Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Dominic Leiven, Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London: John Murray, 2000). For theoretically informed works on the tsarist empire, see Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds, Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997); Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865–1923 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007).


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8. Alexandre Bennigsen was at his most insightful in linking Sultan-Galiev to these broader currents: see Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Sultan Galiev, le père de la révolution tiers-mondiste* (Paris: Fayard, 1986).


