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Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council

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The unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1441 marked the onset of the most severe crisis of legitimacy that the United Nations has faced in the post-Cold War period. While some have asserted that the diplomatic clashes between erstwhile allies France and the United States were inevitable given the rise of American unipolarity, an analysis of events leading to the failed US attempt to gain a second resolution reveals that the outcome was among the least preferred for both participants. Using the Verbs In Context system, we conduct a computer-based content analysis of the public statements of the United States and French leaders. Our findings suggest that the diplomatic breakdown was exacerbated by each leaders’ elevated sense of control over the situation and their inaccurate perception of their opponent’s preferences.

November 8, 2005, will mark the third anniversary of the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (UNSCR 1441), and the end of thirty-six difficult months for the United Nations (UN) and its main security arm. Ironically, the outward comity exhibited during the unanimous passage of the resolution masked the onset of a crisis of legitimacy that was the longest and most extensive that the UN has faced in the post-Cold War period. This crisis reached its peak less than 150 days after passage of UNSCR 1441 when the frustrated president of the United States abandoned his attempt to gain Security Council approval for a second resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Claiming justification for the war in the wording of the November decree, President George W. Bush opted to invade with a “coalition of the willing” rather than face defeat—either from a veto by one or more permanent UNSC members or an embarrassing failure to muster the minimum number of supporting votes.

The legality of the invasion of Iraq that began 48 hours after Bush’s speech will long be a matter of debate. The fact that the world’s most important security institution had been marginalized by the events leading up to the war seems irrefutable. In the minds of some observers, the blow sustained by the UN and the Atlantic alliance was more critical than just being shunted aside (Safire 2003; Glennon 2003). Analysis of the aftermath of the “Trans-atlantic Train Wreck” and its
lasting impact on the UN had already commenced as coalition forces consolidated their position in Iraq following a remarkably brief conventional war.\textsuperscript{1} The tone of the earliest analyses was generally not optimistic. Shortly after the second resolution debacle, even UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed doubts about the UN’s future. Reflecting on the war in Iraq and the problem of extended subregional conflict in Africa, he observed that “[m]any of us sense that we are living through a crisis of the international system” and suggested that events may “force us to ask ourselves whether the institutions and methods we are accustomed to are really adequate to deal with all the stresses of the last couple of years” (Barringer 2003).

Although uncertainty regarding the effects of the clash between permanent members of the UNSC over Iraq has lingered, there is cause for some optimism about the UN’s future. Secretary Annan presciently appended his July comment with the remark that those who dismiss the UN too readily “had to be careful because they may need the UN soon” (Barringer 2003). Recent developments surrounding the handover of Iraqi sovereignty appear to validate this prediction as post-transition emphasis on assembling multilateral economic support for reconstruction in Iraq, and calls for UN reform may gradually rehabilitate the institution. Ultimately, the UN is the only international institution that is both universal in its membership and unrestricted in its policy scope, and these features make it central to any sustained multilateral activity (Tharoor 2003).

Post-train-wreck analysts, left metaphorically sifting through the ashes of the Security Council’s spectacular meltdown, have started to turn their attention away from speculation about what the consequences of the disaster might be to an identification of the cause. Why did the “train wreck” in the Security Council occur?

One of the first prominent attempts to explain the council’s failure was offered by Michael Glennon, who attributes the “dramatic rupture” to “geopolitical forces too strong for a legalistic institution to withstand” (2003:16). He suggests that these forces were rooted in the end of the Cold War and the rise of American unipolarity, that they were magnified by the events of September 11, 2001 (which he claims stiffened American unilateralism), and that the emergence of these factors signaled the “beginning of the end” of a grand, post-World War II experiment that tried (but failed) to restrain power with law.

However, Glennon’s explanation as to why the UNSC failed is hardly an explanation at all. Displaying a degree of structural determinism rarely evinced today by even the most unalloyed neo-realists, he asserts that the rupture was inevitable: “the fate of the council had long been sealed” (2003:18). To support this contention, he evaluates the range of possible outcomes for the diplomatic standoff and then concludes that, in the face of American determination to act, the Security Council had “no good option.” Had it ignored the situation, it would have been sidelined. Had it tried to block the use of force, it would have been deadlocked. Had it acquiesced to US demands, it would have “seemed to rubber-stamp what it could not stop” (Glennon 2003:26). In short, the council was doomed.

Researchers in the field of foreign policy analysis have traditionally been skeptical about structurally deterministic explanations. As Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout argued in their seminal work “Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics,” policy choices are made by decision makers and external factors are related to these decisions “only by being perceived and taken into account in the policy-making process” (1957:318). There are many reasons to believe that a

decision maker’s mental representation of the operational environment could fail to correspond to an external observer’s objective assessment of the same. Jervis (1979), Vertzberger (1990), and others have detailed numerous factors, including perceptual biases and information processing failures, that might generate incongruities between the external world of decision makers and the “worlds in their minds.”

While hindsight may lead us to conclude that a particular outcome seemed inevitable, the indeterminate nature of the relationship between external factors and foreign policy choices suggests that, in crafting an explanation for why a particular historical episode turned out the way it did, we must pay attention to the perceptions of decision makers. Recognizing the contingent nature of perception and policy choice, foreign policy researchers have adopted process-oriented modes of explanation that seek to establish the links between antecedent environmental conditions and foreign policy outputs (Hudson and Vore 1995). For foreign policy researchers, the important questions to ask regarding the UNSC train wreck are: did the actors involved recognize the nature of their predicament? If they did arrive at an accurate assessment of their situation, was this insight immediate or delayed? Did incongruities between external reality and mental models of the environment lead to policies that were unlikely to succeed, squandered resources, created opportunity costs, or had unexpected and lingering consequences? Also of concern to foreign policy researchers is the presence or possibility of a counterfactual outcome. Could a decision maker who misperceived the objective environment, but who acted consistently with regard to his or her own mental model, generate a historical outcome seemingly at odds with the “inevitable” result suggested?

In this study, we investigate the bargaining process that led to the train wreck in the Security Council. We begin with a post hoc analysis of the preferences of the two involved parties (France and the United States), which suggests that deadlock was indeed the likely outcome of the interaction and that this eventuality would lead the United States to bypass the council altogether. We note, however, that this was not the most desirable option for either side. We propose that, at the outset, neither side recognized that the UNSC debacle was predestined to end as it did and that both US and French leaders succumbed to errant subjective interpretations of the bargaining situation. These misperceptions resulted, in part, from an environment where expectations were unclear, where past behavior was unrepresentative of current preferences, and where information was filtered through prior beliefs. These mistakes led participants to overestimate their capacity to shape the final outcome. We conclude that the magnitude of the UNSC crisis may have been exaggerated by the tactics that each side used as they tried to achieve the diplomatic victory they mistakenly believed they could attain.

In making this case, we begin our analysis with a brief review of the events leading up to the US decision to bypass the UNSC. This narrative serves two purposes. First, it allows us to develop a set of inferred preferences that captures the most important and likely outcomes of the UNSC bargaining situation. Second, it provides a reference to identify major crossroads, turning points, and policy shifts over the five-month period prior to the invasion.

Following the narrative, we focus on determining whether or not these inferred preferences were accurately reflected in the parties’ subjective interpretations of the bargaining environment. To assess these subjective interpretations, we conduct a computer-aided content analysis of the public statement of Presidents Bush and Chirac using the Verbs in Context (VICS) coding system. The VICS scheme, developed by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), is based on the operational code construct as refined by Alexander George (1969). It generates indicators of the philosophical and instrumental beliefs that reflect an actor’s impression of the nature of the political environment as well as his or her propensities to select par-
ticular tactics in response to these circumstances. Walker and Schafer (forthcoming) have also developed a “theory of inferences about preferences” deduced from an analysis of operational code scores and sequential decisions in $2 \times 2$ games. We use the verbal acts (public speeches, press conferences, and interview remarks) of the US and French presidents to build a model of each leader’s subjective beliefs about the situation and his likely response to it. We approach this analysis as both a test of the Walker and Schafer inferred-preferences model and as a technique to generate insights into this particular historical failure in tactical bargaining.

### Bargaining Events November 2002 to March 2003

The compromise passage of UNSCR 1441 allowed everyone to claim victory and to argue for the astuteness of their policy position. The US. and British administrations lauded the resolution for reflecting a new firmness with Baghdad, and suggested that the council's unanimity would facilitate recruiting allies for military action should Iraq fail to cooperate with inspections (Kusovac and Beeston 2002). Conversely, France emphasized the symbolic value of the resolution as a commitment to work within the UN framework to strengthen the UN inspection regime and highlighted the removal of elements of automaticity from the initial US proposal (UNSC Record, 11/8/2002).

After 1441’s passage, each leader adapted his bargaining positions in response to the other’s statements and pressed his agenda. President Bush, during a joint press conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on November 21, expressed little faith in the ability of inspections to bring about the disarmament of Iraq (Bumiller 2002). President Chirac staked out his position by emphasizing diplomacy, multilateral behavior, patience, and opposition to any military action not approved by the UNSC. The words of these two leaders were reinforced by the actions they took.

Chirac initiated a diplomatic meeting with the leader of Mexico, a nonpermanent member of the UNSC, where he and President Fox articulated their “common approach to Iraq” and their opposition to “any unilateral attack” (French, Mexican presidents underline common position in Iraq 2002). This November meeting between France and Mexico kicked off a month-long campaign to lobby nonpermanent members and build opposition to US–British calls for forceful disarmament and regime change. The French President implored NATO members to abstain from a commitment to any coalition outside of the UN and met with UN Secretary General Annan, German Chancellor Schroeder, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (on separate occasions) to emphasize support for UN weapons inspectors who had entered Iraq in late November (Chirac holds talks with Syria’s al-Assad 2002). Establishing a pattern that would repeat until the spring, French diplomatic success appeared to overshadow the US effort. Although the United States had earned official NATO support for disarming Iraq, Germany’s indication that it would not support any military action suggested that the NATO approval was purely symbolic and without any serious backing (Bumiller 2002).

In December, inspection activities took center stage. Diplomatic activity focused on the evaluation of the 12,000-page Iraqi-produced report detailing its weapons of mass destruction programs. Again, the two sides clashed. While France advocated slow-paced and careful scrutiny of the document, the US and U.K. government positions were the polar opposite. Britain pressed the council by announcing a “contingency deployment” of forces toward the Persian Gulf in anticipation of possible action against Iraq. The US leadership initiated limited air strikes against military facilities in the “no-fly” zones in northern and southern Iraq, destroying an anti-aircraft radar system southeast of Baghdad (Preston 2002).

The new year altered the Security Council dynamic with an infusion of new members. In accordance with rules governing the service of nonpermanent mem-
bers, five countries (Colombia, Ireland, Mauritius, Norway, and Singapore, who had all voted in favor of UNSCR 1441) were replaced by Angola, Chile, Pakistan, Spain, and Germany. Although Spain’s President Aznar had expressed pro-US sentiment, Germany was clearly opposed (Germany Takes Center Stage 2003). The other new members were unknown quantities with mixed motivations vis-à-vis the US and France. These uncommitted members became the focus of a diplomatic battle between Chirac and Bush.

Perhaps as a tactical response to the reconstitution of the UNSC, or to allow time for the inspectors who were presently operating in Iraq to find evidence of a material breach that would force the Security Council’s hand, Bush adopted a less insistent tone in January. During an address at Fort Hood military base, the US president promised “deliberate” and “decisive” action but tempered his remarks by insisting that “military force was this nation’s last option” (Bush 2003). This apparently conciliatory pronouncement, which closely paralleled the French rhetoric, was noted by Chirac. The French president reciprocated Bush’s signal by adopting a harder line with Iraq. He echoed the US stance by warning Iraq of the consequences that it faced if it failed to fully uphold UNSCR 1441 (Inspectors enter Basra as leaders urge peaceful Iraq solution 2003).

This nascent convergence between US and French oratory was quickly displaced by renewed polarization. On January 17, when UN weapons inspector Hans Blix and International Atomic Energy Agency director Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei appeared at a news conference in Paris to request more time for inspections, President Chirac appeared in person at the event to support the extension request, which had been prompted by the discovery of 11 empty chemical warheads (Bumiller and Sciolino 2003). The response from the White House was 180° from the French response. The US administration touted the warheads as evidence of a material breach of sanctions that sufficiently justified immediate military action. The pressure for rapid action increased when, on January 20, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared that the decision on whether or not Iraq was in fact in violation of 1441 would be made in “a matter of weeks, not in months or years” (Weisman 2003).

Not long after this exchange, and possibly as a reaction to the accelerating pace of events, the threat of a French veto materialized. In response to a reporter’s question concerning the hastening pace of military preparations and American pressure on the Security Council, French Foreign Minster Dominique de Villepin refused to rule out the possibility that France would vote against any military action (France raises stakes for US with hint of UN veto 2003). In its position, France received support from soon-to-be UNSC chair Germany. The German Foreign Minister asserted that inspectors should have “all the time which is needed” to perform their duties (Landler 2003). The threat of a veto substantially intensified the nature of French opposition raising the stakes in the diplomatic standoff.

De Villepin’s statement, the tightness of Franco-German unity, and the obstacle it presented to the United States fueled a growing war of words among top officials from both sides of the Atlantic. On January 22, Secretary Rumsfeld berated the two countries as “old Europe” (Purdum 2003). Despite pleas for civility by their respective leaderships, the remark led senior officials in Paris and Washington to exchange invectives that occasionally bordered on obscenity. Sensing that the situation might be spiraling out of control, the White House indicated its willingness to accept a delay of up to several weeks for UN inspectors to continue work in Iraq. From the perspective of Europe’s capitals, Franco-German unity and resistance appeared to have won a concession from the United States.

Although publicly the war of words had been curtailed, behind the scenes, Chirac, Bush, and Tony Blair battled to garner support for a future vote. Bush and Blair focused on the new NATO states in Central and Eastern Europe in addition to selected European Union members such as Spain and Portugal. Chirac, with
Chancellor Schroeder’s help, took his case to the rest of the 15-member European Union, to fellow permanent UNSC members Russia and China and to Iraq’s regional neighbors Syria and Egypt (Charmelot 2003).

On January 30, the United States claimed a major victory in this diplomatic contest. Eight European leaders published a signed statement supporting the US–U.K. stance on Iraq in Europe’s major newspapers, arguing that “the credibility of the United Nations is on the line” (Eight European leaders urge unity with US over Iraq 2003). Although Chirac had regularly invoked UN legitimacy to buttress his case for multinational cooperation, the letter signaled that the United States was determined to shift blame for any damage inflicted to multilateral institutions to an obstructionist France. Moreover, the letter, which had surprised the French president, brought into question Chirac’s assertion that the French position reflected European public opinion. In many of the signatory countries, political leaders and the press on both the left and right had denounced American warmongering. All eight countries had witnessed extensive public protest marches against the war. Chirac was reportedly “stung by the pro-American backlash” (Bremner 2003).

Tony Blair seized the opening presented by this rebuke to try to bridge the French-Anglo gap. President Chirac and the British leader met for an annual summit at Le Touquet on February 4. Just days earlier, during a meeting in Washington, Blair had convinced the White House to seek a second resolution as a way of mollifying France and Germany and winning allies for the coalition. It was suggested that a second resolution would help Chirac to save French face and maintain a role in any Iraq conflict. The London Times claimed that the French leader intensely desired both of these things (The Paris Predicament 2003). At Le Touquet, however, Chirac adopted an uncompromising stance and Blair failed to budge him from his opposition to a war. Their postsummit press conference was marked by “awkward silences and eager attempts to patch over . . . a growing diplomatic divide” (Sennott 2003).

Despite the failure of the Anglo-French summit, the willingness of the United States even to consider a second resolution—and to allow Blair to sell it to the recalcitrant Europeans—suggested that the United States believed that Chirac was amenable to a compromise. The action may also have led Chirac to believe that the United States was committed to operating under UN auspices, and would therefore be more willing than they had let on to make concessions to get the second resolution. Several prior events also suggested that the United States was flexible. At crucial junctures in the diplomatic exchange, the White House made measured concessions to the Franco-German position. A hopeful statement, a few weeks more time for inspectors, another round of diplomacy—all came as a response to French resistance. The offer of a second resolution suggested that persistence was paying off.

Taking advantage of the support that the US government had received in European capitals, US Secretary of State Colin Powell made an appearance before the Security Council on February 5. He delivered an extensively mediated presentation of the case for invasion of Iraq, focusing on the presence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. It was heralded as a diplomatic and public relations success in Washington. Powell’s performance seemed to galvanize the US elite, press, and public opinion behind President Bush’s stance on Iraq (Firestone 2003). However, the speech did little to move the UN Security Council members’ positions. Several countries suggested that all of this ostensibly rich intelligence that the United States had gathered should be used to guide Hans Blix and the UN weapons inspectors (implying that it had been secretly and intentionally held back and exploited for propaganda purposes) (US report leaves world divided on Iraq as spotlight shifts to Blix 2003).

On February 7, during a phone conversation with President Bush, Chirac pressed his case that the world could “disarm Saddam Hussein without war” (Iraq can be disarmed without war, Chirac tells Bush 2003). The two men agreed on the
need to consult regularly on their shared objective. Again, Bush seemed accommodating. Chirac announced later on the same day that he would “welcome a second resolution” (No use of force against Iraq without second UN vote: Chirac 2003). Having opened the door to a second resolution, the White House began courting UNSC member votes. Early polling of the membership suggested that at least 11 of the 15 members of the Security Council wanted to extend inspections rather than use force (UN Chief Inspectors head to Baghdad as French up resistance to US-led war 2003). Chirac, via telephone, lobbied the governments of China, Pakistan, Angola, and others. Bush also spoke with the leaders of the non-permanent Council members.

On February 15, France scored another diplomatic victory. After weapons inspector Hans Blix delivered his progress report, Foreign Minister de Villepin argued that a decision on war was premature and that inspections should continue. His presentation generated an unusual outburst of applause among the normally staid Security Council attendees (Holloway 2003a). Surprisingly, France was joined not only by the Russian and Chinese governments, but the British government too when U.K. Foreign Minister Jack Straw agreed that Hans Blix should be given more time (Johnson 2003). With indications that resistance in the council might drive a wedge between the United States and Britain, Colin Powell’s response to the council drama was muted. He refused comment on a proposal for the council to meet again on March 14 and responded somberly that the members should “all go back to our capitals, reflect on it” (Holloway 2003a).

Two days after the UNSC meeting, large antiwar protests were held in the capital cities of Britain, Spain, and Italy—all countries that had openly supported Washington (Holloway 2003b). Emboldened by the Security Council victory, buoyed by the support of two permanent members and a preponderance of nonpermanent members, and encouraged by the tone of European public opinion, Chirac stated unequivocally that France would oppose any attempt to introduce a second resolution authorizing military action against Iraq (Summary of day’s events on Iraq 2003). On February 18, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin explained that France was “not planning to isolate and to block [a resolution],” but to gain “more and more backing,” and to look “for a majority in which we would win support” (France hopes to win UN support to halt war drums, rather than wield veto 2003). Less than one week later, the French government, in conjunction with Russia and Germany, produced a step-by-step disarmament plan to avoid war (Russia, Germany to sign French proposal on boosting UN weapons inspections 2003). They introduced the counter proposal to the Security Council in the belief that US leaders were not committed to defecting from the UNSC, and that French diplomatic preponderance could, at the very least, force the United States to the bargaining table.

On March 10, a draft of a second UNSC resolution was also circulated. It listed the signatories as the United States, Great Britain, and Spain. The proposal gave a deadline of March 17 for Iraqi compliance with all previous UNSC resolutions and indicated that, should this deadline not be met, military action would be authorized. France reported on that same day that it would vote “no” on the resolution, but Chirac claimed that this would not be an effective veto since Washington lacked the nine necessary votes to pass the resolution to begin with (Knox 2003). Over the previous week, President Bush and Secretary Powell had worked continuously to alter the balance of power in the council by lobbying nonpermanent UNSC members (Rival camps lobby UN Security Council members ahead of war vote 2003). They had not been very successful. Leading up to the submission of the second resolution, the United States had secured only four votes and few had shifted since mid-February (Brinkley 2003). As Chirac was explaining this fortuitous voting arrangement to reporters, his Foreign Minister was en-route to visiting the governments of the three African nonpermanent UNSC members Cameroon, Guinea, and
Angola, to ensure that no surprise vote changes were forthcoming (French FM arrives in Cameroon to win support against war on Iraq 2003).

March 13–16 brought the final flurry of diplomatic activity. Each of the main actors made a last-ditch effort to sway the other members of the Security Council. So unsuccessful was the US effort, and so frustrated was the United States, that Secretary Powell declared that further UN debates were “without purpose” (Washington, in final stages of diplomacy, says UN debate now pointless 2003). He further suggested that the United States might remove its resolution before a vote could be taken and work from outside the international body.

The possibility that the United States would leave the Council and proceed unilaterally prompted the first sign of compromise from the European side. Desperate to retain UN control over the process, Chirac offered to move up the deadline for UN inspections by 30 days (Chirac could back 30-day deadline for inspectors to end work in Iraq 2003). In response, US Vice President Dick Cheney appeared on television to dismiss the French proposal as nothing more than a delaying tactic, saying “it’s difficult to take the French serious [sic]” (Sanger and Hoge 2003).

On Monday March 17, Great Britain and Spain set a 24-hour deadline for approval of a resolution that would authorize force. France rejected the ultimatum, and the United States withdrew the doomed proposal (Hoge 2003). The United States had left the bargaining table. On March 18, President Bush spoke on US television. He delivered a 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq. Chirac, in a similarly televised speech, condemned the action as lacking UN approval (World condemns Iraq war, fears for civilian lives 2003).

**Decision Options and Inferred Preferences**

Naturally, this narrative must omit a great deal of the news that occurred from November 2002 until March 2003, including the statements and actions of other nations (notably the needling commentary that the Iraqi regime often directed at the United States in response to council developments and global protest). However, it does provide a sense of the shifts in momentum and tactics that impacted the bargaining process in the council. Figure 1 depicts a decision tree of the range of possible outcomes of the resolution episode.

The decision tree focuses solely on the US and French options. Although Britain (and to an extent Germany) played an important role, the central struggle in the UNSC was between France and the United States. Although there are seven outcomes in the tree, they can be classified roughly according to the general payoffs. Outcomes A1 and A2 are those in which the United States achieves its goal without compromising. This result could occur either through French acquiescence at the outset (i.e., when Blair suggests going along with a second resolution at Le Touquet) or by calling France’s “veto bluff.” Outcomes B1 and B2 indicate compromise outcomes for the United States either multilaterally or bilaterally. These constitute a settlement outcome, since a negotiated resolution would have delayed an attack to allow for more time for inspections. Outcomes C1 and C2 indicate deadlock situations where France, alone or with other permanent members, blocks an authorizing resolution, forcing the United States to decide whether to honor the council’s choice or opt for an external coalition after clear UNSC rebuke. Outcome D describes the situation where the United States, unwilling to compromise, opts to abandon the UNSC process having been unable to buy or win enough votes. This action is taken knowing that a second resolution will not get a majority and is intended to avoid the problem of having to convince the US public to pursue a course of action that the UNSC has explicitly rejected.

At the bottom of the diagram, we suggest the likely rank-ordering of these outcomes according to the narrative presented. These preferences reflect our assertion that gaining the legitimating support of the UNSC (on acceptable terms) was always
France opposes US position in UNSC and threatens use of veto?

Yes

US believes it has good prospects for support for 2nd resolution in UNSC

Yes

(pursue 2nd UNSC resolution)

Outcome A1: US gets 2nd resolution without having to compromise or confront UNSC resistance. France perhaps rewarded with influence in management of conflict or rebuilding.

No

US concede to French?

Yes

Outcome B1: US gets 2nd resolution only with accommodation to French. Possible limits on use of force or temporal delays for lengthened inspection efforts.

No

France undermines US majority?

Yes

French bluff called, France loses credibility.

No

Can US shift key votes without concession on 2nd resolution?

Yes

USlobbies key UNSC voters and accepts cost of side payments. Return to Start

No

US makes concession on 2nd resolution to gain majority?

Yes

Outcome B2: US gets 2nd resolution only with multilateral compromise. Possible limits on use of force or temporal delay for lengthened inspection efforts

No

Outcome C1: UNSC deadlocked, France isolated; US must decide whether to proceed with “Coalition of the Willing” and claim international support despite French obstinacy.

Outcome D: US withdraws 2nd resolution, avoids UNSC defeat or deadlock and sidelines the UNSC institution, while proceeding with a “Coalition of the Willing.” Outcome raises questions about future of UNSC.

Outcome A2 US gets 2nd resolution without compromise.

French bluff called, France loses credibility.

US Preferences: A1 > A2 > C1 > (D) > C2 > B1 > B2 [Dominate > Deadlock > (Terminate) > Settle > Submit]

France Preferences: B1 > B2 > C2 > A1 > C1 > A2 > (D) [Settle >-dominate > Deadlock > Submit > (Terminate)]

preferable to opting out of the UN system. We additionally assert that France wanted to avoid isolation, even preferring acquiescence to a “lone veto” position had that situation arisen. It is somewhat unclear whether France would have preferred a three-way veto with Russia and China over acquiescence, since isolation would have been less of a factor. Nevertheless, a three-way veto would certainly have prompted a U.S. decision to avoid the council.

Simplifying the decision tree allows us to construct Table 1, a 2 × 2 strategic form game with dichotomous choices for both the United States and France. Recalling the preferences from Fig. 1, we suggest that US preferences were: Dominate 4 Deadlock 4 Settle 4 Submit. French preferences were: Settle 4 Dominate 4 Deadlock 4 Submit.

It is important to note that when moving to the 2 × 2 table, the United States would prefer to terminate the strategic interaction, ending the game, rather than accept the two outcomes marked by asterisks. France prefers all of these options to the “termination” choice. The Nash Equilibrium and the nonmyopic equilibrium from Brams’ Theory of Moves (TOM) are indicated in bold text.

Note: Bracketed numbers indicate ordinal preferences for [U.S.A., France].

2 On March 5, several European newspapers repeated a story that first broke in the Paris newspapers Le Monde and Le Canard Enchaine (a small investigative and satirical weekly). It contained quotes allegedly from a conversation between French Foreign Minister de Villepin and members of Chirac’s UMP party in which the minister suggested that France would never use its veto power since that would be tantamount to “shooting the Americans in the back” (France using its veto “would be like shooting the Americans in the back,” 2003), although the Minister later denied making this statement (French FM denies saying veto would be “shooting the Americans in the back,” 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>Cooperator</th>
<th>Defector</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defector</td>
<td>US approaches UNSC for 2nd resolution unwilling to make concessions. France concedes to U.S. position (or backs down from veto threat). (US Dominates, France Submits) [4,1]</td>
<td>US approaches UNSC for 2nd resolution unwilling to compromise. France vetoes 2nd resolution. UNSC deadlocked but France is isolated. US proceeds with “Coalition of the Willing” but can claim international support aside from obstinate French. (Deadlock) [3,2]</td>
</tr>
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Note: Bracketed numbers indicate ordinal preferences for [U.S.A., France].

*Indicates that the United States would prefer to terminate the interaction rather than accept these outcomes. The Nash Equilibrium and the nonmyopic equilibrium from Brams’ Theory of Moves (TOM) are indicated in bold text.
this objective referent, the result would—at best—imply an overdetermined outcome or—at worst—suggest that subjective factors were spurious. However, we contend that an explanation that accounts for both the outcome and the process leading to it is preferable to one that accounts for the outcome alone. In making this assertion, we draw upon the extensive discussion of the centrality of processes and mechanisms to the making of causal claims, particularly in the social sciences (Little 1991, 1998; George 1979; Salmon 1984; for counter arguments, see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Of course, the introduction of subjective factors demands a sacrifice in explanatory parsimony. Nevertheless, this sacrifice appears justified along two lines of reasoning. First, a process-based understanding of how the outcome came about makes greater use of the existing data from the episode. Second, tracing the interaction and perception-induced bargaining tactics may provide insights into the source of continuing postoutcome tensions. Attention to process may increase our understanding of why the train wreck in the UNSC occurred, and why it was so severe.

**Concepts, Hypotheses, and Research Design**

To transform the general propositions suggested above into testable hypotheses, we use the operational code construct. As Walker and Schafer (forthcoming) describe it, operational code analysis is a “self-in-situation-oriented” research approach that is part of a cognitivist family of approaches situated within the broader foreign policy decision-making research program. The decision-making approach to foreign policy analysis and the “man-milieu” concept trace their origins to seminal works by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1954), and Sprout and Sprout (1956), respectively. Operational code analysis attempts to determine how a subject’s perception of the political decision environment “orients and propels” the actor via his or her preferences and choices (Walker and Schafer forthcoming).

Although the origin of the operational code concept is attributed to Nathan Leites (1951), the contemporary cognitivist conceptualization of the term is credited to Alexander George (1969). George defined an individual’s operational codes as a set of foundational beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the effective strategies and tactics to use in dealing with other political agents. George suggested that assessing an individual’s likely responses to ten questions (presented in Table 2) could identify the essential core of the op-code construct with regard to that person. As Walker and Schafer (forthcoming) observe, these beliefs effectively operate as “mirrors” (with some distortion) of the “real” political environment as well as “steering mechanisms” that filter incoming information and shape the individual’s preferences and future choices. As beliefs change, they may also reflect “learning processes.”

For roughly 30 years after George defined his questions set, the primary technique used to assess “answers” to these questions (for elites who could not be directly asked) was to use at-a-distance analysis. This approach was typically qualitative in nature and involved assessing the sum of the content of the individual’s written or spoken communication using psychohistorical techniques. Examples of such studies, including those by George (1969, 1979), Holsti (1977), Walker (1977), Hoagland and Walker (1979), and others, are extensively reviewed in Walker’s analysis of the evolution of the operational code construct (1990). Occasionally, quantitative content analysis tools were used. However, there was no widely employed systematic technique in use before the 1990s.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, advances in computer-aided text processing of natural language prompted a renewed investigation into the construction of a reliable and systematic content analysis scheme for assessing the operational codes of foreign policy leaders at-a-distance. Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), in an article titled “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,” introduced the VICS...
method. The technique has been applied in dozens of analyses (for examples, see Crichlow 1998, Marfleet 2000; Schafer and Walker 2001; for a review, see Walker and Schafer forthcoming).

VICS is a quantitative content analysis scheme rooted in social attribution theory. It takes as its unit of observation the transitive verbs contained in the speech acts of a particular individual. The grammatical subjects, verbs, and objects in these statements, taken as a whole, provide an indication of an individual’s mental representation of “who is doing what to whom and how” and reveal his or her mental representation of the political universe. Verbs are classified according to their valence (positive or negative), tense (past, present, or future), and type (words or deeds). Each verb, along with its grammatical subject (either self or other) and object (for domain), constitutes a unit of observation that is combined with other such units in the same verbal act. Aggregation of these observations allows for the construction of indices that correspond to George’s questions on a speech-by-speech basis. The strength of VICS analysis as an at-a-distance measure lies in its reduced emphasis on the surface content of the communication, which might be manipulated for instrumental purposes or audience effect (Larson 1988), in favor of attention to deeper systematic patterns of positive or negative self or other attributions generated by the speaker.

As part of their program to assess the link between operational code beliefs and strategic behavior, Walker and Schafer (forthcoming) have developed a “theory of inferences about preferences” deduced from an analysis of operational codes scores and sequential decisions in $2 \times 2$ games. The inferences are determined from a subject’s VICS scores on three key indicators of the op-code construct: I-1 “approaches to goals,” P-1 “nature of the political universe,” and P-4a “control over historical development” or “locus of control” (P4a for self and P-4b for other since $P4b = 1 - P4a$). These are compared with a norming sample of world leaders for whom an extensive number of individual speech acts have been collected. When the index scores lie above this norm, the index is considered “+” for the purposes of inferring preferences. Where they lie below the norm they are considered “−”.

### Table 2. Alexander George’s Questions for Defining an Individual’s Operational Code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
<td>What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
<td>What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
<td>Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4</td>
<td>How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in moving history in the desired direction?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-1</td>
<td>What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2</td>
<td>How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3</td>
<td>How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4</td>
<td>What is the best timing of action to advance one’s interests?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5</td>
<td>What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Key indicators in italics. Source: George (1969, 1979).*

3 Details regarding the calculation of these indices are provided in Appendix A.
for that purpose. For the P-4 index, a plus or minus one standard deviation norming range was set. If an actor’s P-4 VICS score falls within this range, it is considered ‘‘≈’’; otherwise, it is either above ‘‘>’’ or below ‘‘<.’’ The specific predictions about actor preferences that Walker and Schafer provide appear in Table 3.

To read Table 3, look at the appropriate self or other column to confirm the appropriate VICS indices involved. Then, consult the ‘‘Values’’ column to determine the pertinent preference rankings given the values of these indices. For example, if the self I-1 is above the norming range (+) and P-4a is within the ±1 SD range (=), then the preferences for self are: Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit (Deter/Reward). If an actor’s P-1 score is below the norming mean (−), and his P-4b score is within the norming range (=), then the actor’s perception of the other’s preferences are: Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit (Punish/Compel). These two preference orderings (the revealed self and the perceived other) can be combined to generate a subjective strategic-form 2 × 2 game matrix.

Recalling the inferences at which we arrived from the bargaining narrative and the decision tree, we suggested that US preferences, at least by the end of the UNSC standoff, were Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit, which conforms to the “Bully” rank-ordering in Table 3. French preferences of Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit conform to the “Exploit” category. From this we can infer some expected operational code index scores and advance the following hypotheses:

[H1] If President Bush’s operational code indicators reflect these objectively inferred preferences, his I-1 scores should be below the mean (conflictual), and his P-4a scores should be above the average range (self in control) at least by the end of the bargaining period.

[H2] If President Chirac’s operational code indicators reflect these objectively inferred preferences, his I-1 scores should be above the mean (cooperative) and his P-4a scores should be above the average range (self in control) at least by the end of the bargaining period.

If the proposition that President Bush [H3] and President Chirac [H4] misperceived the bargaining environment is true, then each leader’s P-1 scores and P-4b scores should not reflect the actual preference of his strategic rival.

If the proposition is true that the “train wreck” was exacerbated by an overestimation by the leaders of their capacity to control events, then both Bush [H5] and Chirac [H6] should reflect high locus of control scores throughout the diplomatic standoff.

[H7] In a test of the mirroring capability of the operational code indicators, the subjective interpretations of the leaders should fluctuate in response to developments suggested in the historical narrative.
To test these hypotheses, we collected the verbal acts of President Bush and President Jacques Chirac that took place between the passage of Resolution 1441 on November 8, and when the US president indicated his intention to abandon the UNSC process by issuing an independent ultimatum to Saddam’s regime on March 18. Appendix B details the data used. To satisfy the minimum requirements of the VICS scheme, we selected verbal acts of at least 1,000 words in length with significant foreign policy content (which we determined to be 40 percent or more of total words). For the verbal acts of President Bush, we relied upon the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents available on-line in machine-readable form from the US Government Printing Office Access website. For President Chirac, we consulted a variety of on-line sources including the Official Website of the Office of the French President and the US embassy in France, which maintains an archive of Iraq-related news and public statements by French officials. We also consulted Agence France Presse (in English) via the LexisNexis database service. The relatively larger number of statements by President Bush compared with the number by Chirac may reflect the fact that the GPO is tasked with meticulously recording all of the US president’s public communication and that no such resource appears to exist for the French president. However, we are reasonably confident that the sample of speeches, interviews, and remarks listed for each leader represents the population of codeable, foreign policy-relevant verbal utterances made during this time period by each leader. For several utterances made by Chirac that were available only in French, we relied on a combination of machine translation and our own cross-checked human translations to convert them into English. To conduct the VICS coding, we used an automated, computer-based, natural language processing tool (Profiler +), using the latest coding dictionaries graciously supplied by Stephen Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young.

Results and Analysis

In presenting our results for each leader, we begin with a narrative-centered analysis of the temporal changes in the key VICS scores (P-1, I-1, P-4a) over the four-and-a-half-month period between passage of 1441 and Bush’s decision to abandon US efforts in the UNSC. As part of this analysis, we identify the distinct “phases” reflected by the scores of each leader. Phase shifts reflect a change in the subject’s perception of the political environment and his approach to it according to Table 3. We determined when a new phase had been entered by reference to the VICS scores. When a moving average score changed in such a way as to result in a categorical shift in inferred preferences according to the Walker and Schafer theory, we noted this as a phase change. For example, if a score shifted from below a norming mean (≤) to above it (≥), or from below the norming range (≤) to within it (≥), such a transition indicated that a new phase had begun. For Bush, the UNSC bargaining episode appears to be divided into five phases. Chirac exhibits three.

US President Bush

Figure 2 presents, in two graphs, the P-1 and I-1, and the P4a VICS scores generated through the content analysis of President Bush’s verbal acts. The solid horizontal line in the top graph (a) depicts the norming mean for P-1. The dashed line in the same graph depicts the norming mean for I-1. When an index score lies

4 http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html
above this norm, the index is considered ‘+’ for the purposes of inferring preferences. When it lies below the norm, it is considered ‘−’ for that purpose. In the bottom graph (b), the solid line represents the norming mean, and the two dashed lines delineate the ±1 SD range around that mean. If the VICS score lies within this ±1 SD range, it is considered ‘=’; otherwise, it is either above ‘>’ or below ‘<’.

Fig. 2. (a and b) President Bush’s Key Verbs In Context System Scores: November 8, 2002, to March 18, 2003

6 The indicator lines reflect a weighted, centered moving average (WCMA) with a lag and lead of 1 observation of the VICS index over the selected time period. The weighting controls for the relative volume of codeable material in each verbal act so that smaller acts do not disproportionately affect the trend line. We selected a centered average in order to smooth the fluctuations in the index values. We believe that this is justified by the conceptual definition of operational code as an underlying belief structure. By reducing the short-term noisiness present in the VICS indicators, the centered average generates a more valid representation of the deeper trends while retaining information about temporal change, which would be lost in a simple aggregation of these data into a single VICS score for each leader. It also prevents us from having to determine aggregation phases or decision episodes a priori.
President Bush’s VICS scores indicate five distinct phases for the purposes of inferring preferences. The first phase lasts from the November 8 passage of 1441 until roughly the start of the new year. In the first phase, the upper graph’s depiction of Bush’s I-1 index (his approach to goals) shows that it is distinctly higher than the norming average. This reflects his above average propensity for cooperative self-attributions ($Z = 1.06$). Bush’s P-1 score is also generally (although slightly) above average ($Z = .267$). The lower table reveals that, for the most part, Bush was also above the norming average range for the P-4a (locus of control) indicator throughout this time ($Z = 1.323$). The VICS scores suggest that Bush was confident in his own control of a generally cooperative political environment. Bush’s self and other attribution patterns were both positive.

Recalling the narrative, we could interpret these data as reflecting a post-1441 confidence in the support of the UN, the European allies, and in his prospects for achieving his goals. After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States had enjoyed broad international support for the “War on Terrorism” and activities in Afghanistan. Little had occurred, thus far, to undermine this support. The score could also have reflected Bush’s belief that the inspectors’ findings would support the U.S. contention that Iraq had been building a WMD stockpile.

The second phase (B) begins in early January. The most pronounced shift exhibited in Bush’s VICS scores in this phase relates to his pattern of self-attribution. His I-1 score falls below the norming average into a negative position ($Z = -.327$). Bush’s locus of control indicator also falls into the one-standard-deviation norming range during the early part of this period and does not rise significantly beyond this range by the end of the phase ($Z = .980$). The scores appear to reflect growing frustration with the nature of the Anglo-French exchange. His P-1 scores, however, remain relatively stable at or above the norming average ($Z = .015$), indicating that he continued to view the political environment as cooperative. It may be that his P-1 index was buoyed by the letter from the eight European leaders that suggested that some future cooperation from like-minded allies was still possible. However, his negative I-1 scores reflect the erosion of his confidence in the utility of cooperative tactics vis-à-vis the UNSC dissenter.

The third phase (C) begins at the start of February and coincides with Blair’s visit to Washington, the Anglo-French summit, Powell’s presentation to the Security Council, and Bush’s cautious acceptance of the second resolution initiative. The President’s I-1 VICS scores show a distinct upward recovery close to those in phase A, as do his locus of control scores ($Z = .619$ and $Z = 1.348$, respectively). This suggests that Bush’s confidence in cooperation was enhanced by the generally positive diplomatic developments that appeared to have vaulted him back into a position of control. However, the trend for the P-1 scores, for the first time since the passage of 1441, begins to turn negative ($Z = -.029$), suggesting that the US president no longer believed that the other actors in the political environment had cooperative intentions. This downturn coincides with the mid-February diplomatic successes of the French, including de Villepin’s applause-generating UNSC presentation and the support provided to Chirac from the other permanent and non-permanent members.

The fourth phase (D) reveals a dramatic turn in Bush’s VICS scores. His I-1 and P-1 scores both plunge into negative territory ($Z = -.890$ and $Z = -1.42$, respectively). Although less dramatic, his P-4a score also trends downward. Nevertheless, this index remains above the norming range ($Z = 1.51$) for this phase indicating that, even with the decline in cooperation, Bush retained a sense of confidence.

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7 Phases were determined primarily by reference to the P-1 and I-1 scores since the P-4a scores displayed less variability overall. However, when P-1 and I-1 were unchanging but P-4a varied, a phase shift was noted.

8 $Z$-scores are based on a comparison of the mean of the weighted indicator scores for Bush or Chirac for the designated phase against the distribution of scores for a sample of 35 world leaders.
control over events. Bush’s high locus of control scores in this phase and in phase A and C lend provisional support to Hypothesis 5. The P-1 scores certainly reflect Bush’s anger and frustration with French obstructionism and the diplomatic failures that the United States encountered as it tried to garner majority support in the Security Council. His increasingly negative view of the political world is coupled with a reversal of the cooperative tactics that he has previously favored.

In the fifth phase (E), both Bush’s I-1 and P-1 scores continue their downward trend, reaching the lowest levels observed during this diplomatic standoff ($Z = -1.427$ and $Z = -2.735$, respectively). In addition, his P-4a score also reaches its lowest level ($Z = .506$), placing Bush well within the norming range. These scores suggest that the US president perceived the environment as one of mutual noncooperation where neither side could claim to control events. At the end of this phase, Bush abandoned negotiations altogether.

Figure 3 depicts Bush’s subjective interpretation of the strategic game for each of these five phases as revealed by his VICS scores. Using the I-1 and P-4a scores for self, and the P-1 and P-4b score for other, we consulted Table 3 to identify Bush’s ranked preferences as well as his perception of the ranked preferences of “other.” We combine these preference orderings to produce a formal model of Bush’s perceived strategic environment and to suggest his likely response (cooperate or defect) during that phase.$^9$ Having identified the strategic-form games in each phase,

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9 It should be noted that the “other” scores are not dependent solely on content in Bush’s verbal acts directed at or attributed to France. To restrict the data gathered to such content would have made this analysis nearly impossible. Because the “other” scores reflect the total sum of other attributions, they may only partially reflect Bush’s perception of the UNSC bargaining game. They may also reflect other conditions of Bush’s political environment. This does generate problems from the standpoint of using VICS indices as a predictive tool, since the confounding influence will only weaken the measurable relationship between Bush’s op-code and the specific instance of choice over tactics we are investigating. From the perspective of hypothesis testing, the “noise” in the other index may increase the chance of our finding an incongruence between Bush’s op-code regarding the “other” and French preferences (or vice versa for Chirac). This noise should be considered when we draw our conclusions. However,
we determined the outcome through the application of Brams’ TOM for sequential game play (1994). For the phase A games for both leaders, we begin with the assumption that the passage of 1441 signaled an initially cooperative position (the game begins at Co, Co being the settlement quadrant). For each subsequent game, the initial state of the game in that phase is determined by the outcome of the prior phase. Self (the row player) is assumed to be the first mover in each instance when determining TOM solutions.

Bush’s initial tactical choice, in phase A, was to cooperate given the “Exploit–Appease” game interpretation presented and the initial state of the game. The pattern of game payoffs suggests that Bush believed that his opponent would give him what he wanted (his highest ranked outcomes) if he acted agreeably. His optimal strategy shifts for phase B. Although still relatively certain that his opponent would cooperate, Bush now believes that his best option is to take a hard-line position and to press for his preferred outcome (his dominant strategy is Cf). However, according to the payoffs of this subjective game, a hard-line position would lead to deadlock. According to Brams (1994), players can be nonmyopically rational with regard to move selection. TOM predicts that Bush would choose to continue cooperation from the prior phase to avoid a degenerating series of counter moves that would result in an inferior deadlock outcome.

In phase C, Bush’s subjective game reveals a conundrum. Bush has no dominant strategy and the game is without a Nash equilibrium. However, his VICS scores and subjective preferences indicate that he believes that his opponent is bluffing and that Other would prefer submission to deadlock. This arrangement of payoffs implies that Bush could successfully threaten a hard-line position and, at worst, achieve his second highest ranked outcome. However, the payoff from dominance is lower than the payoff from settlement (mutual cooperation). Although Bush believes he could force his opponent to submit, he would prefer willing cooperation. This subjective game seems congruent with Bush’s ambivalence during this period when the eight European leaders published their letter, Powell made his presentation to the UNSC, and Blair tried to achieve a second resolution following the Anglo-French summit.

In phase D, Bush’s perception of the environment becomes quite negative, although he still feels in control. His preference orderings reflect his belief that the opponent is pursuing a bluff strategy and that by using a bully response, he should ensure compliance. This strategic episode coincides with the period in early March when the United States began to position itself to introduce a second resolution that would have forced the hand of the French to either acquiesce or use their veto. To Bush’s frustration, support from the nonpermanent voting members of the UNSC was not forthcoming.

Phase E begins roughly about the time when Secretary of State Powell suggests that diplomatic struggle in the Security Council had become pointless. Bush’s negative P-1 and I-1 scores combined with his low locus of control values indicate that the president is similarly resigned to failure in the UNSC. His preference rankings as depicted in Fig. 3 reflect symmetrical noncooperative strategies for “self” and “other” with neither in control. This Punish/Compel preference ordering in the final phase does not perfectly conform to the expectations of Hypothesis 1, which required President Bush’s operational code indicators for I-1 and P-1 to be below the mean and his P-4a scores to be above the average range at the end of the bargaining period (a Bully strategy). However, the inferred strategy for this final phase is not far removed from the predicted Bully strategy. In fact, Bully was the strategy Bush adopted in the prior phase (D), and had his preferences remained steady (had his locus of control scores not declined), they would have been com-
pletely consistent with the preferences suggested by the decision tree and game analysis in Table 1. One could argue that, rather than indicate his bargaining position, Phase E reflects Bush’s response to the outcome of the diplomatic standoff. Such an interpretation would make Phase D the last strategic phase. From this, we would conclude that the VICS op-code system and the Walker–Schafer inferred preference theory were closer to success than failure in this regard.

With respect to the accuracy of Bush’s representation of the other’s preferences during this final phase, our analysis of the decision narrative suggested that France’s strategy would be “Exploit.” Bush’s subjective assessment indicated that he perceived a French strategy of “Punish/Compel.” This is divergent on both the dimensions of valence and control. This incongruence between Bush’s perception and France’s inferred preferences lends provisional support to Hypothesis 3, which predicted inaccuracy in the subjective representation of the opponent’s preferences. Interestingly, although inconsistent with an objective referent, Bush’s subjective interpretation of the “other” strategy is somewhat consistent with Chirac’s subjective preferences as inferred from his indicators described below.

French President Jacques Chirac

Figure 4 presents, in two graphs, the P-1 and I-1, and the P4a VICS scores generated through the content analysis of President Chirac’s verbal acts. The solid horizontal line in the top graph again depicts the norming mean for P-1. The dashed line in the same graph depicts the norming mean for I-1. In the bottom graph, the solid line represents the norming mean and the two dashed lines delineate a plus or minus one standard deviation range around that mean. The standards of determination of phase shift are the same as those we applied to Bush’s scores.

Chirac’s VICS scores indicate three phases. In phase A, the upper graph’s depiction of Chirac’s I-1 index (his approach to goals) shows that it is distinctly higher than the norming average. This indicates his propensity for cooperative self-attributions. Chirac’s P-1 score is also above average. The lower table reveals that for the most part, Chirac was within the plus or minus one standard deviation norming range for the P-4a (locus of control) indicator throughout this time. This first phase lasts from the November 8 passage of 1441 until mid-January. The indicators suggest that Chirac’s operational code during this time period reflected an average sense of influence in an environment that he generally perceived as cooperative. Chirac’s “self” and “other” attribution patterns were both generally positive. Recalling the narrative, we could interpret this as reflecting, as it did with Bush, a post-1441 sense of support for continued UNSC involvement and, at least, no pessimism in his perceived prospects for achieving a peaceful outcome.

Phase B begins in mid-January. The most pronounced shift exhibited in Chirac’s VICS scores relates to his locus of control indicator, which rises substantially above the norming range during this period. Chirac’s P-1 and I-1 indicators both remain, as they were in phase A, above average and rise slightly through the end of January and into February. The scores appear to reflect his confidence in the prospects of achieving his goals and again lend support to Hypothesis 5, which suggests that the “UNSC train wreck” was rooted in an exaggerated confidence regarding control over events. The new power arrangements in the UNSC, the support received from the other permanent and nonpermanent members, and the outpouring of antiwar public opinion are likely sources of this confidence. Conversely, the setback offered by the “letter of the eight” appears not to have had an appreciable effect on the French President, observations by the press notwithstanding.

Phase C reflects a dramatic shift in Chirac’s key operational code indicators compared with the first two. Starting in mid-February, Chirac’s P-1 indicator moves distinctly lower into the negative range. This indicates a pattern of negative “other”
attributions. His I-1 scores also follow this trend, signifying that he is adopting a more conflictual posture. His locus of control score remains steadily above average. The pattern suggests pessimism about the orientation of the opponent, and a decision to meet this negativity with a hard-line response. Again, his high sense of control reflects confidence that such an approach would be successful. Recalling the narrative, late February marked the point at which France appeared to hold all the diplomatic cards. However, the pattern of negative self-attributions seems at odds with the public articulation of Chirac’s plan for peaceful multilateral settlement. The indicators may in fact reflect his intransigent opposition to U.S. efforts to win a second resolution.

Figure 5 depicts Chirac’s subjective interpretation of the strategic situation as revealed by his VICS scores as they relate to the inferred 2 × 2 game preferences in Table 3. Using the I-1, P-4a scores for “self,” and the P-1 and P-4b score for “other,” the table designates Chirac’s ranked preferences as well as his perception of the ranked preferences of “other.” These are combined to produce formal models of
his perceived environment. Using TOM, we can deduce his likely strategy (cooperate or defect) based on this subjective assessment of the political situation. As in the case of Bush’s phase A games, we assume that the initial state is cooperative following the passage of UNSCR 1441.

The games for the first two phases reflect Chirac’s generally positive impression of the political environment. In both phase A and phase B, Chirac’s payoffs from the subjective game suggest that he would offer cooperation and expect the same in return from his opponent. However, in phase C, Chirac’s pattern of “other” attribution takes a negative turn. His self-attribution also trends negatively, resulting in a subjective game defined by a pair of noncooperative strategies. However, his locus of control indicator implies that Chirac believes that he has the upper hand in negotiations. The payoffs from the phase C game show that Chirac believes that he can adopt a hard-line position, which provides a better payoff than cooperation. He believes Other would prefer submission over deadlock.

Note: Payoffs indicate rank order from high (4) to low (1) in Chirac’s subjective game. Cells in quotes indicate the initial state of the game based on the outcome of prior phase. Underlined payoffs indicate the nonmyopic equilibrium outcome according to Brams’ TOMS (1994). * indicates the Nash Equilibrium. Bold text indicates Chirac’s tactics for that game phase given his subjective perception of the payoffs.

**FIG. 5.** Theory of Moves Solutions for Subjective Games over Three Phases for President Chirac
the objective U.S. preference was Bully (−, >). Bush’s choice of strategy as reflected in his VICS scores was, for a time, consistent with this prediction. In the end, although, Bush shifted to Punish/Compel (−, =). Chirac’s perception of the preferences of “other” in his strategic environment was Bluff (−, <). Although Chirac’s beliefs accurately reflected the valence of the other’s behavior, he underestimated the other’s sense of control. Since the issue of who occupies a stronger negotiation position is central to understanding the UNSC “trainwreck,” the difference leads us to accept Hypothesis 4 provisionally (that the leaders would misinterpret the preference of the other). Nevertheless, in all three instances, the valence of the inferred strategy was correct. The decision-tree analysis posited that control rested with the U.S. administration (since it could opt out of the bargaining). Bush’s VICS scores suggest that he did feel in control through most of the negotiation, only falling into the “equal control” range for phase B and the end of phase D. However, Chirac appeared to believe, as revealed in his P-4a score, that he, too, was in control during the latter half of the negotiations. Given the narrative analysis of events, in terms of the UNSC diplomatic game, he surely appeared to be. Had Chirac’s subjective preference more accurately reflected his limited control over events, the subjective game and Chirac’s choice of strategic response might have been quite different.

Figure 6 reflects a modified phase C subjective game where the locus of control is switched between “self” and “other.” As this figure indicates, a hypothetical shift in locus of control would have resulted in Chirac’s perception of the game being a “Bluff–Bully” contest in which the optimal strategy, given the propensity of “other” to defect, is to submit. Ironically, if Chirac had even considered his opponent as having a level of control equal to his own, the subjective game would have perfectly mirrored Bush’s in the final phase.

**Conclusion**

After the passage of 1441, the United States labored for 150 days, expending considerable diplomatic capital and credibility, trying to convince the UNSC to support its policy, to no avail. Tough talk to the contrary, it is unlikely that either Bush or Blair were happy to return to their domestic constituencies empty-handed. Each was left to rally support at home by claiming world support and blaming France for its obstructionism—while drawing attention away from the fact that two other permanent members and most nonpermanent ones were also opposed to an invasion.

Chirac too left the UNSC standoff with a taste of failure. Emboldened by his early diplomatic victories, the consensus against the US policy in the council, and by his ever-rising domestic popularity that had peaked in mid-March (Chirac popularity at all time high over Iraq 2003), the French president failed to recognize the imminence of US withdrawal from the UNSC process.

While some have claimed that this result was inevitable, we suspected that an explanation of the prewar debacle in the UNSC could be enhanced through an understanding of the errant subjective interpretations of the bargaining situation made by the leaders involved. We advanced several hypotheses that related to this assertion. To test these, we began our analysis with a review of the events leading up to the US decision to bypass the UNSC. This allowed us to develop a decision
matrix that captured the range of likely outcomes and allowed us to identify major crossroads, turning points, and policy shifts that might be “mirrored” in the operational codes of the selected leaders.

After the narrative, we focused on determining the degree to which the inferred “objective” preferences were inaccurately reflected in the parties’ subjective interpretations of the bargaining environment using the VICS coding system. We used the verbal acts (public speeches, press conferences, and interview remarks) of the US and French leaders as a data source to build models of each leader’s beliefs about the situation and their likely response to it.

Our findings were as follows: first, there was support for our hypotheses (3 and 4) that leaders had inaccurately gauged the preferences of the “other” in their subjective interpretations of the political environments. This result comes with the caveat that valences were gauged accurately (cooperation was correctly distinguished from conflict), and it was the critical element of control that was the source of error. The two leaders seemed to systematically overestimate their influence and underestimate that of their rivals (a finding that is commensurate with much social attribution research). Second, as hypothesized, both leaders displayed an above average confidence in their capacity to influence events (Hypotheses 5 and 6). We demonstrated how, in Chirac’s case, this overconfidence could have led him to stand firm, when submission might have been a better choice, in the final phase of bargaining. We examined a counterfactual subjective interpretation where Chirac’s control indicator was reduced and the game reconstituted such that a train wreck was avoided. Third, we found that, at least in the case of Bush, using the VICS system, we could somewhat accurately reflect the objectively derived decision preferences via the subject’s subjective preference (Hypothesis 1). However, in the case of Chirac, the two did not conform (Hypothesis 2). This unexpected result might be attributed to the relatively small sample of verbal acts for the French leader compared with the number we collected for Bush, errors in our translation of some speeches from French, or errors in our objective determination of French preferences as reflected in the decision tree and the $2 \times 2$ game representation.

In assessing our final hypothesis, that the operational code indicators of both leaders should demonstrate a mirroring response to changes in the external diplomatic situation, we must rely on some subjective interpretation of when each leader viewed the situation as adverse or favorable. For Bush, the greatest periods of adversity were, first, shortly after the UNSC reformed in 2003 with new members and France hinted at a veto and, second, after the French–Russian–German proposal and the protests at the end of February leading up to the mid-March standoff. Both of these periods evince low or declining cooperation scores for the US president in Fig. 2. For Chirac, aside from the eight-leaders letter, most diplomatic events seemed to favor the French position. However, the French president’s cooperation scores dip noticeably after Powell’s presentation to the UNSC, when it became clear that the real power play had begun (see Fig. 4). Although hardly conclusive, this pattern favors provisional acceptance of the mirroring tendencies of the operational code measures.

In the end, our results suggest that one explanation for the events leading up to the Iraq war is the human failing of hubris. It was the pathology of overconfidence, as much as the irresistible push of some ineffable force poised to smash the UN, that generated these inauspicious outcomes. More than anything, the train wreck in the UNSC reveals how posturing, rivalry, and misplaced faith in one’s ability to control events can generate myopic behavior with the potential for lingering harm.
### Appendix A

See Table A1.

**Table A1. Verbs in Context Belief Indices in a Leader’s Operational Code**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical Beliefs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-1 Nature of the political universe (image of others)</td>
<td>% Positive minus % Negative Transitive Other Attributions</td>
<td>+ 1.0 friendly to − 1.0 hostile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2 Realization of political values (optimism/pessimism)</td>
<td>Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributes divided by 3</td>
<td>+ 1.0 optimistic to − 1.0 pessimistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3 Political future (Predictability of other’s tactics)</td>
<td>1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Other Attributions</td>
<td>1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4 Historical development (focus of control)</td>
<td>Self (P4a) or Other (P4b) Attributions divided by [Self plus Other Attributions]</td>
<td>1.0 high to 0.0 low self-control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5 Role of chance (absence of Control)</td>
<td>1 minus [Political Future × Historical Development Index]</td>
<td>1.0 high role to 0.0 low role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental Beliefs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-1 Approach to goals (direction of strategy)</td>
<td>% Positive minus % Negative Self-Attributions</td>
<td>+ 1.0 high cooperation to − 1.0 high conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2 Pursuit of goals (intensity of tactics)</td>
<td>Mean Intensity of Transitive Self-Attributions divided by 3</td>
<td>+ 1.0 high cooperation to − 1.0 high conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3 Risk orientation (predictability of tactics)</td>
<td>1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self-Attributions</td>
<td>1.0 risk accept- and to 0.0 risk averse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4 Timing of action (flexibility of tactics)</td>
<td>1 minus Absolute Value [% X minus % Y Self-Attributions]</td>
<td>1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Coop v. Conf Tactics</td>
<td>Where X = Coop and Y = Conf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Word v. Deed Tactics</td>
<td>Where X = Word and Y = Deed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5 Utility of means (exercise of power)</td>
<td>Percentages for Exercise of Power Categories a through f divided by total</td>
<td>+ 1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Reward</td>
<td>a’s frequency divided by total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Promise</td>
<td>b’s frequency divided by total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Appeal/Support</td>
<td>c’s frequency divided by total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Oppose/Resist</td>
<td>d’s frequency divided by total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Threaten</td>
<td>e’s frequency divided by total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Punish</td>
<td>f’s frequency divided by total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between − 1.0 and + 1.0. P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range.

Appendix B

See Tables B1 and B2.

**Table B1. Sample of Verbal Acts by President Bush**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 11, 2002</td>
<td>Remarks at a White House Reception for Veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 13, 2002</td>
<td>Remarks Following a Cabinet Meeting and an Exchange with Reporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 18, 2002</td>
<td>Interview with European Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 20, 2002</td>
<td>Bush and Havel Press Conference, Prague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 20, 2002</td>
<td>Remarks to the Prague Atlantic Student Summit, Prague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3, 2002</td>
<td>Luncheon Speech: Terrell for Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 2002</td>
<td>Remarks Announcing the Smallpox Vaccination Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 2002</td>
<td>President Discusses Iraq and North Korea with Reporters, The Coffee Station, Crawford, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks by the President to the Press Pool, Prairie Chapel Ranch, Crawford, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 3, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks to the Troops at Fort Hood in Killeen, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 22, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks on the National Economy in St. Louis, Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28, 2003</td>
<td>Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 29, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks in Grand Rapids, Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31, 2003</td>
<td>The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 6, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks on the Iraqi Regime’s Noncompliance with United Nations Resolutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 9, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks at the “Congress of Tomorrow” Republican Retreat Reception in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 13, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks at Naval Station Mayport in Jacksonville, Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 14, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks on Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 22, 2003</td>
<td>The President’s News Conference with President Jose Maria Aznar of Spain in Crawford, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 26, 2003</td>
<td>Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute Annual Dinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 6, 2003</td>
<td>The President’s News Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 2003</td>
<td>The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso of Portugal, President Jose Maria Aznar of Spain, and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom in the Azores, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 17, 2003</td>
<td>Address to the Nation on Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table B2. Sample of Verbal Acts by President Chirac**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 22, 2002</td>
<td>Press Conference at the NATO Summit in Prague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 7, 2003</td>
<td>Speech to the Diplomatic Corp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 22, 2003</td>
<td>Joint Press Conference with Gerhard Schroeder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 22, 2003</td>
<td>Speech to the Castle of Versailles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 25, 2003</td>
<td>Speech to the Group of Eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2, 2003</td>
<td>Address to the Second International Meeting of Professional Culture Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 4, 2003</td>
<td>Joint Press Conference with Tony Blair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10, 2003</td>
<td>Press Conference at Elysee Palace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10, 2003</td>
<td>Speech at Elysee Palace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16, 2003</td>
<td>Interview with Time magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 10, 2003</td>
<td>Iraq Interview with TF1 and France 2 Television, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 2003</td>
<td>Interview with CNN and 60 Minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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References


